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Federal Regulation of Municipal
Securities: Disclosure Requirements
and Dual Sovereignty
New York City's financial crisis in 1975 prompted investor demands
for more extensive disclosure by municipal issuers.' The long-standing
exemption of municipal securities from federal disclosure regulation
2
I. The terms "municipal debt" and "municipal securities" generally refer to the
obligations of states as well as their political subdivisions. Therefore, all references in
this Note to municipal obligations should also be taken to embrace state obligations.
For accounts of New York City's financial crisis, see Klurfield, How New York Was
Rescued, Newsday, Dec. 7, 1975, Magazine, at 6; Weisman, How New York Became a
Fiscal Junkie, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 8. As' the City's financial
difficulties surfaced, yields on municipal securities soared. See Municipal Securities Full
Disclosure Act of 1976: Hearings on S. 2969 and S. 2574 Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 163-64
(1976) (statement of Richard Carver, Mayor of Peoria, Il.) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings]; N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6. The Joint Economic Committee found
that increases in interest charges of approximately $1.5 billion over the life of bonds
issued by other cities in 1975 were attributable to New York City's crisis. STAFF OF
JOINT ECONOMIC CoMm., 94TH CONG., lsr Szss., STUDY OF NEW YORK CITY'S FINANCIAL
CRIsIs 46-51 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as JEC]. In addition to higher yields,
investors demanded greater disclosure. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1976, at 43, col. 6; Wall St.
J., Jan. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
2. Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(2) (1970), expressly
exempts from the registration and reporting requirements of the statute "[alny security
issued or guaranteed .. .by any State of the United States, or by any political sub-
division of a State or territory, or by any public instrumentality of one or more States
or territories ... or any security which is an industrial development bond."
Section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(12) (Supp. V
1975), exempts "municipal securities" from the requirements of that Act. Section 3(a)(29)
of the 1934 Act, id. § 78(c)(a)(29), defines municipal securities as "direct obligations of,
or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by, a State or any political sub-
division thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of a State or any political subdivision
thereof, or any municipal corporate instrumentality of one or more States, or any
security which is an industrial development bond." An "industrial development bond"
is defined by reference to I.R.C. § 103(c)(2).
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, which regulate municipal securities dealers
and brokers, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (Supp. V 1975), retain these exemptions. Subsections 78o-4
(d)(l) and (2) prohibit direct or indirect requirements that force a municipality to file
"any application, report, or document in connection with the issuance, sale, or distribu-
tion" of securities, or to disclose "any application, report, document, or information with
respect to such [municipal] issuer."
None of the exemptions applies to the antifraud provisions of the 1933 or 1934 Acts.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j (1970). For discussions of existing law and proposed revisions, see
Casey & Smith, A New Look at Municipal Bonds-Disclosure Responsibilities in the
Municipal Bond Market, 50 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 639 (1976); Doty, Application of the Anti-
fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws to Exempt Offerings: Duties of Under-
writers and Counsel, 16 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. REv. 393 (1975); Doty & Petersen, The
Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. L. REV. 283
(1976); Rosenzweig, Municipal Securities and the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal
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came under attack as investors, suddenly aware of New York's success
in concealing its true financial condition,3 questioned the efficacy of
current regulation under the vague antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties laws.4 Investors' demands for adequate disclosure regarding mu-
nicipal securities are frustrated by the absence under the present
securities laws of clear legal standards specifying the information to
be disclosed or assigning liability for nondisclosure. The resultant un-
certainty about the legal duty to disclose and the lack of investor
confidence are particularly troublesome since a healthy municipal
securities market is essential to both overall economic stability and the
financing of local government. 5
Current proposals for reform would not remedy this situation.0 They
leave materiality and liability standards undefined. Further, they fail
to accommodate the Tenth Amendment limitations on federal regula-
tion of state and municipal governments enunciated by the Supreme
Securities Laws, 4 SEc. REG. L.J. 135 (1976); Comment, Federal Regulation of Municipal
Securities: A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1261; Note, Federal
Regulation of Municipal Securities, 60 MINN. L. REV. 567 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Regulation]; Note, Disclosure by Issuers of Municipal Securities: An Analysis of
Recent Proposals and a Suggested Approach, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1017 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Proposals]; Note, Municipal Bonds and the Federal Securities Laws: The Results
of Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 28 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1975) Lhereinafter cited as
Indirect Regulation].
3. To eliminate deficits from its balance sheet, New York City consistently over-
estimated expected revenues and shifted costs between years. Haider & Elmore, New
York at the Crossroads: The Budget Crisis in Perspective, CITY ALMANAC, Feb. 1976, at
1, 9-10. The city also paid for such current expenses as manpower training and planning
by issuing long-term bonds and notes. JEC, supra note 1, at 5.
4. Hearings, supra note 1, at 266-68 (statement of Municipal Finance Study Group);
see N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 48, col. 2.
5. The amount of municipal securities outstanding grew by $145 billion from 1960
to 1975. Hearings, supra note 1, at 52 (statement of Harvey Kapnick, chairman of Arthur
Anderson & Co.). In recent years between $25 and 530 billion in long-term municipal
securities has been sold annually. Id. From 1970 through 1975, state and local govern-
ments raised an average (net of refunding) of $16.2 billion annually in credit markets,
an average over the period of 8.1% of all net funds raised in United States credit
markets. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS AccoUNTS
3n QUARTER 1976, at 2-3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 AccouNTs].
6. Several bills have proposed a framework for regulation separate from the exist-
ing regulatory structure. H.R. 2724, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2969, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 1, at 5-13; H.R. 15205, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976), reprinted in Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act of 1976: Hearings on
H.R. 15205, H.R. 10523, H.R. 10530, H.R. 10606, and H.R. 11534 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Con-
merce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. Congress
also considered bills that would have eliminated the municipal securities exemptions in
both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. S. 2574, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 1, at 3-4; H.R. 10523, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), and H.R. 10530, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976), both reprinted in House Hearings, supra at 13-15. Only S. 2969 and H.R.
15205 were considered realistic options, however. Hearings, supra note 1, at 41, 141-42;
House Hearings, supra at 19, 29, 40, 86.
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Court in National League of Cities v. Usery. This Note proposes a
regulatory scheme that relies on clear statutory standards for disclosure,
enforced by underwriter liability. Such a system, it is argued, should
ensure adequate disclosure while satisfying the limitations imposed by
Usery.s
I. Inadequacies of the Present Regulatory Structure
A. The Need for Disclosure
The purpose of disclosure regulation is to generate a flow of in-
formation to investors that promotes efficiency in capital markets and
protects investors from fraud and misrepresentation.9 Disclosure reg-
ulation promotes capital market efficiency by facilitating investment
decisions based on accurate predictions of future returns from the
7. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
8. The Note's argument thus differs from those analyses that attempt to refute the
traditional justifications for the exemption: lack of abuses, investor sophistication, and
the costs that regulation would impose on municipalities. See Hearings, supra note 1, at
165; House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Murphy); cf. Stock Exchange
Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.), 56 and 97 (73d Cong.) Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 16, at 7441-52 (1933) [herein-
after cited as Stock Exchange Hearings] (George B. Gibbons, municipal bond dealer)
(setting forth the traditional reasons for exemption). For example, in introducing S. 2969
Senator Williams argued that two of these justifications-investor sophistication and
costs to municipalities-were no longer valid. Senator Williams asserted that the reduced
share of commercial banks in the new issue market meant that individual, and hence
less sophisticated, investors were purchasing a larger proportion of municipal debt. 122
CONG. REc. S1632 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976). He also maintained that an "erosion of in-
vestor confidence" after the New York City crisis led to higher costs, and thus that dis-
closure costs would be offset by the lower interest rates that would result from in-
creased investor confidence. See id. at S1632-33.
The Senator's initial premise, however, is questionable. It is difficult to predict the
future role of individual investors in the municipal securities market. Although in-
dividual investors have held increasing dollar amounts of municipal securities, and have
increased their share of total municipal securities holdings from 1972 to 1974, their
share of municipal securities outstanding in 1974 was only 29.1%, which is substantially
lower than their 35.2% average share of holdings in the middle 1960s. BOARD OF GovER-
NORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, FLOW OF FUNDS, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OUTSrANDING 1974, at
10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1974 AccOUNTS]; see note 14 infra. Furthermore, disclosure
will not necessarily lead to lower yields.
9. The goals of disclosure and their priority are a matter of some controversy. See
Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 311, 313 & n.9 (1974). Compare Bentson, Required Disclosure and the Stock
Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 132,
152 (1973) (primary goal is fair and efficient operation of capital markets) with Ferber,
The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. REv.
621, 622 (1970) (primary goal is to improve morality of marketplace). The two major
goals, promoting capital market efficiency and protecting investors, can conflict. Ander-
son, supra at 330-31. Disclosure that is unjustifiable on economic efficiency grounds,
because of the costs of collecting and disseminating the information, may nonetheless be
required to provide full protection to investors.
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security, thereby encouraging issuers of securities to undertake those
capital projects likely to be most profitable. 10 Disclosure protects in-
vestors by subjecting the fiscal actions of the issuer to public scrutiny."
Municipal securities, however, are sufficiently different from cor-
porate securities to warrant a separate regulatory framework. Munic-
ipal securities are issued to finance public rather than private projects,
and are generally safer investments than corporate bonds.' 2 Moreover,
10. A socially efficient allocation of resources is one in which all resources are em-
ployed in the activities in which their social returns are highest. The most efficient
allocation of resources by capital markets would require disclosure of all information
necessary to yield the best predictions of future returns. See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMM'N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (THE WHEAT REPORT) 60-61 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
WHEAT REPORT]; Hearings, supra note 1, at 115 (remarks of Jackson Phillips, exec. vice
pres., Moody's Investor Service, Inc.). Some economists have defined an "efficient" capital
market as one in which prices fully reflect available information. See Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383, 383 (1970).
Other economists have recognized that information is itself produced at a cost and is
subject to the forces of supply and demand. Gonedes, The Capital Marhet, the Market
for Information, and External Accounting, 31 J. FINANCE 611, 612-15 (1976).
There is some dispute whether compelled disclosure produces information of sufficient
utility to investors to justify the costs of regulation. Compare R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 198-99 (1972); Bentson, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Ac-
counting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF COR-
PORATE SECURITIES 23, 72-76 (H. Manne ed. 1969); and Stigler, Public Regulation of the
Securities Markets, 19 Bus. LAW. 721, 730 (1964) with Gonedes, Evidence on the Informa-
tion Content of Accounting Numbers: Accounting-based and Market-based Estimates of
Systematic Risk, 8 J. FINANCIAL & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 407, 433-36 (1974). See also J.
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 147-63 (1935)
(predominant activity of developed securities markets is forecasting psychology of market
rather than prospective yield of assets). Resolution of this controversy is beyond the
scope of this Note. The disclosure standards proposed here are designed to facilitate
accurate appraisals of investment risk for each type of municipal security, and thus at-
tempt to meet the major criticism of securities regulation-that the information disclosed
has little economic significance. See pp. 946-51 infra.
11. Protection of investors was a central concern of the drafters of the 1933 and 1934
Acts. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1934); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1933). Commentators have
noted several ways that disclosure protects investors. See, e.g., L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEO-
PLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92-99 (rev. ed. 1932) (publicity most effective
means of encouraging bankers' adherence to fiduciary duties); Schoenbaum, The Rela-
tionship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORDHAm L.
REV. 565, 577-78 (1972) (disclosure encourages corporate managers to adhere to higher
standards of conduct). It has also been suggested that the opportunity for fraud in-
creases as the amount of information decreases because the security's price becomes less
representative of its true economic value. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure,
62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 610 (1964).
12. During the period 1948-1965, permanent losses of interest and principal on mu-
nicipal bonds amounted to less than $10 million, or .01% of the municipal debt outstand-
ing. G. HEMPEL, THE POSTWAR QUALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL DEBT 28 (1971); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND, BUILDING A BROADER MARKET 115 (1976). Of the $500 million of municipal
bonds that were in default during 1945-1974, -$334 million were revenue bonds financed
by three toll roads. Id. In comparison, in the 1970s alone an estimated $1.6 billion in
corporate long-term and short-term debt was defaulted. Id.
Underwriting of municipal and corporate securities differ in two important respects.
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since interest on municipal securities is exempt from federal income
taxation,13 the market is probably composed of investors subject to the
highest tax rates.'- High-income and institutional investors are likely
tp be financially sophisticated; municipal securities would therefore
seem to warrant less pervasive regulation than corporate securities.' 5
The information necessary to protect investors and enable them to
assess risk accurately varies with the type of municipal security.' 6 Debt
First, commercial banks, which are subject to Federal Reserve regulation, can underwrite
general obligation municipal securities but not corporate securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970
& Supp. V 1975). Second, competitive bidding requirements for general obligation bonds
eliminate the private placement option open to corporations. This difference is significant,
since corporations have increasingly resorted to private placements to avoid the costs of
registered offerings. See Bentson, supra note 10, at 67-70 (private placements 3% of total
offerings during 1900-1934, 46% during 1933-1965). Competitive bidding also reduces the
incentive for an underwriter to research an issue thoroughly because the effort will be
for naught if the bid proves unsuccessful. Trading in Municipal Securities: Hearings on
S. 1933 and S. 2474 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the House Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 154, 158-61 (1974) (statement of Securities
Industry Ass'n).
Proposals before Congress to subject municipal bonds to the same regulation as
corporate securities overlook these distinctions. As a result the proposals received no
support in Senate hearings. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 41, 141-42.
13. I.R.C. § 103(a).
14. As indicated in 1974 figures, the municipal securities market is dominated by three
groups-commercial banks (48.8%), households (29.1%), and fire and casualty insurance
companies (15.5%). 1974 Accours, supra note 8, at 10. The "household" category is
residual and includes holdings of private trusts. If investors are rational and consider the
tax exemption, it is likely that "holdings of tax-exempts [by individuals] are highly
bunched at the upper end of the marginal tax scale." Galper & Petersen, The Equity Ef-
fects of a Taxable Municipal Bond Subsidy, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 611, 617 (1973). Commercial
banks and fire and casualty insurance companies invest in municipal securities largely
because these institutions are subject to stricter tax treatment than other -financial in-
termediaries and thus place greater value on tax-free income. See Clark, The Federal
Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1629-31, 1664-66 (1975);
cf. R. ROBINSON, POSTWAR MIARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 84 88
(1960) (tax exemption, varied coupon dates, and desire to participate in underwriting
account for bank holdings).
Future composition of the market is difficult to predict. Tax considerations, bank
demands for loanable funds, and losses incurred by fire and casualty insurers are major
factors. See Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1976, at 20, col. 2. Recently commercial bank participa-
tion in the market has decreased: banks absorbed 61.3% of the increase in municipal
securities outstanding from 1960 to 1974, but only 18.7% in 1974 and 1975. 1976 Ac-
COUNTS, supra note 5, at 3; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, FLOW OF FUNDS
ACCOUNTS 1945-1968, at 74-75 (1970); 1974 AccouxTs, supra note 8, at 10; Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, Dec. 31,
1975, at 1 (1976); id., Dec. 31, 1973, at 1 (1974). Whether this decline is a temporary or
long-term trend, and whether individuals (rather than other institutions) have increased
their share of the market, are uncertain.
15. The preponderance of sophisticated investors was a major reason for the original
exemption of municipal securities from federal regulation. Stock Exchange Hearings,
supra note 8, at 7450 (statement of George Gibbons, municipal bond dealer).
16. SECURITIES INDUSTRY Ass'x, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 3-4 (9th ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as SIA]; Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 136. Recent commentators have
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 919, 1977
service for general obligation bonds, which are issued directly by the
city,17 is paid from general tax revenues. The riskiness of these bonds
is thus a function of the city's debt structure, public service obliga-
tions, and ability to collect taxes or otherwise obtain revenues.ls
Revenue and industrial development bonds are issued by separate
municipal entities, and the city usually does not promise to repay
these debts out of its general revenues. 19 Rather, debt service on
revenue bonds is paid from the revenues of the public project (e.g., a
toll bridge or highway). 20 The riskiness of these bonds depends on
the ability of the project to generate revenues sufficient to cover pay-
ments on principal and interest.21 Industrial development bonds are
not focused on the important differences between the types of municipal securities and
the consequences of these differences for disclosure regulation. See, e.g., Proposals, supra
note 2, at 1054-58; Federal Regulation, supra note 2, at 595 (stating only that distinctions
should be made).
17. Municipalities also issue short-term notes, which are a form of general obligation
debt. In 1974 the amount of short-term debt (12 months or less) issued (S29.1 billion)
exceeded the amount of long-term debt issued ($22.8 billion). Hearings, supra note 1, at
124. However, in 1974 short-term securities comprised only 8.7% of total state and local
securities outstanding. 1974 ACCOUNTS, supra note 8, at 10.
18. See A. RABINOWITZ, MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION 136-40 (1969);
Indirect Regulation, supra note 2, at 614.
Losses of principal and interest on general obligation bonds have been rare, G. HENi-
PEL, supra note 12, at 15-32, but there are indications that the quality of municipal debt
has decreased. Id. at 7. In particular, central cities in the Northeast and Midwest are
experiencing serious declines in their tax bases, thus increasing the likelihood that those
cities will be unable to meet their service and debt obligations. See JEC, supra note 1,
at 11-18. The possibility of default increases the significance of the uncertainties sur-
rounding the measure of creditor compensation under the Municipal Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-418 (West Supp. 1977), i.e., determining the "going concern value" of
a city or dividing anticipated revenues between essential services and debt service. See
Note, Reform of Creditor Participation Procedures in Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE
L.J. 423, 439 & n.94 (1976).
19. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 10, at 37. Indeed, cities have increasingly
set up independent projects and public authorities to limit municipal liability for
desirable, but perhaps nonessential, undertakings. Id. at 43-53. To increase the attrac-
tiveness of revenue bonds to investors municipalities have sometimes issued "moral
obligation bonds," which are revenue bonds backed by a moral (nonlegal) obligation of
the municipality to meet debt service payments if the project's revenues prove in-
adequate. Id. at 53; J. PETERSEN, CHANGING CONDITIONS IN THE MARKET FOR STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 10-12 (Jt. Econ. Comm. Print 1976).
20. Cities also issue special obligation bonds, the revenues of which are derived from
a specific tax source. Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 136. These can be classified as either
general obligation or revenue bonds, depending upon the degree to which the tax source
exhausts the city's potential tax base. See G. HEMPEL, supra note 12, at 97.
21. Speer, What Every Lawyer Should Know About . . . Municipal Bonds, 44 ILL. B.J.
146, 146-47 (1955). Revenue bonds are not necessarily riskier than general obligation
bonds. Hearings on S. 1933 and S. 2474, supra note 12, at 126-27 (Wayne Anderson, Nat'l
League of Cities). However, 91% of the dollar value of all municipal debt in default
(or principal backing interest in default) from 1945 to 1965 involved 27 municipal units,
all but six of which defaulted on revenue bonds. G. HEMPEL, supra note 12, at 27. The
riskiness of revenue bonds is increased insofar as political pressures cause officials
managing a project to attempt to offer as many services as possible at the lowest cost
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serviced by the rents that a private firm pays to a public authority
whose sole purpose is to issue bonds, build an industrial plant, and
collect rent to pay off the debt.22 Investors in such bonds must be aware
of all factors that affect the financial health of the tenant industrial
firm.2 3
For each type of bond there are persuasive indications that disclosed
information is inadequate under the existing regulatory scheme. Cur-
rent disclosure neither promotes capital market efficiency nor protects
investors. Municipalities frequently provide immaterial information 24
and use dissimilar accounting methods that prevent meaningful com-
parisons between cities.2 The timing and frequency of disclosure
possible. For example, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey invested
additional funds in mass transit despite restrictions in its revenue bond contracts
prohibiting such use because revenues were not sufficiently above costs. See United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 97 S. Ct. 1505 (1977) (rev'g 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976))
(Supreme Court held that state legislatures' unilateral abrogation of revenue bond provi-
sions that precluded use of revenues for mass transit violated the contract clause).
That revenue bonds are generally perceived as riskier investments than general obliga-
tion bonds is evidenced by the higher interest rates (.25 to 1.50 percentage points) of
the former. Swensen, The Cyclical Behavior of the Net Interest Cost Differential Be-
tween General Obligation Bonds and Revenue Bonds, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 123, 123 (1974).
22. Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 136. Typically the municipality does not back the
bonds with its tax revenues. 4 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2588 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
Critics have charged that industrial development bonds are merely a means of financing
private ventures with debt carrying tax-free interest, to the detriment of the federal
treasury. Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures With Tax-Exempt Bonds: A Developing
"Truchhole" in the Tax Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 224, 232 (1965); Note, The Proliferation of
Industrial Revenue Bond Financing: Ban the Bond?, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 289, 309 (1968).
Congress responded to these criticisms by revising § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code,
narrowing the definition of industrial development bonds that are given the federal in-
come tax exemption. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-42, reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2373, 2379; see I.R.C. § 103(c)(2). Although these re-
forms virtually eliminated the traditional industrial development bond (which financed
an industrial plant), the exceptions provided (especially that for pollution control
facilities, id. § 103(c)(4)(F)), have allowed issuance of huge amounts of industrial develop-
ment bonds (S5 billion in 1975). TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 12, at 45.
23. Indirect Regulation, supra note 2, at 614-15.
24. Disclosure may be inadequate because too little information is provided or be-
cause immaterial information is disclosed. Before the New York City crisis, investors
demanded little information, and, as a consequence, very little information was disclosed.
See J. PETERSEN, supra note 19, at 23 (little investor concern except over revenue bonds).
After the crisis, however, underwriters demanded extensive disclosure, much of which
had little significance except as a hedge against their future liability. See note 40 infra.
25. Coopers & Lybrand, one of the nation's largest accounting firms, and the Uni-
versity of Michigan studied 46 of the 50 largest cities in the United States and concluded
that disclosures by these cities were not standardized, were almost unreadable because of
their volume, and omitted significant information. COOPERS & LYBRAND, FINANCIAL DIs-
CLOSURE PRACTICES OF THE AMERICAN CITIES: A PUBLIC REPORT 5-6 (1976). Among the
questionable practices uncovered were failures to use accrual accounting and to disclose
accrued pension and employee benefits and details of leases. Id. at 26-29. Another of the
"Big Eight" accounting firms made similar criticisms. ARTHUR ANDERSON & CO., SOUND
FINANCIAL REPORTING IN TIlE PUBLIC SECTOR (1975). Further, a representative of an in-
925
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has failed to take into account the differences between types of mu-
nicipal securities.20 Evaluations by private rating agencies, the most
influential sources of market information, have frequently been chal-
lenged as inaccurate and tainted by political considerations.27 Even the
most sophisticated participants in the municipal securities market,
underwriters and institutional investors, have only recently begun to
undertake independent evaluations of municipal securities.28 Their
success will depend on the incentives for disclosure created by the
regulatory scheme.
Municipal disclosure is also influenced by political considerations.
Politicians, who control the information to be disclosed, have incen-
tives to conceal important fiscal decisions from voters and investors
surance holding company with large municipal bond holdings ($501 million) testified that
inadequate disclosure in the municipal securities market complicated calculations of risk
by institutional investors and made .detailed analyses by individual investors "prac-
tically impossible." Hearings, supra note 1, at 203-04 (statement of Gilman Gunn).
26. The frequency of disclosure should reflect the rate at which the investment risk
of a security can change. The economic base and broad taxing power of a municipality
are likely to change slowly, while specific revenue sources and industrial firms are more
susceptible to shifts in market demand and supply and thus can be expected to face
greater variation in revenues.
27. The rating agencies were severely criticized for their failure to give any early
warning of the New York City crisis. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1976, § 3, at 9, col. 1. See
generally J. PLrEmEN, THE RATING GAME (1974). Individual as well as institutional in-
vestors rely on ratings for evaluations of bond quality. SIA, supra note 16, at 26-28, 80;
Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 138; N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1976, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Wall St.
J., Oct. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
A major criticism of the rating agencies has been that they lack the number of
analysts needed to assemble, verify and analyze disclosed information. Id. Empirical tests
of the accuracy of municipal bond ratings as predictors of bond quality are hampered
by the insignificant number of defaults since the 1930s. G. HEMPEL, supra note 12, at
113; cf. Ang & Patel, Bond Rating Methods: Comparison and Validation, 30 J. FINANCE
631, 639-40 (1975) (prediction methods using only published financial data are as suc-
cessful as rating agencies in predicting actual financial distress, but neither are of much
use for periods longer than two years); West, Bond Ratings, Bond Yields and Financial
Regulation: Some Findings, 16 J.L. & ECON. 159 (1973) (ratings correlate with bond yields
because regulations often restrict institutional investors to securities with higher ratings).
Officials of New York's Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) and the United States
Treasury Department have charged that Moody's Investor Service's ratings of MAC bonds
were politically biased. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1976, at 51, col. 6; id., Sept. 28, 1976, at 1,
col. 4. However, some investors have alleged that Moody's was not strict enough with
municipal issuers before the New York crisis. Id., Mar. 14, 1976, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
28. Underwriters and institutional investors employ very few full-time municipal credit
analysts. Hearings, supra note 1, at 272 (statement of Ronald Forbes, Assoc. Prof. of
Finance, State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany). Efforts by underwriters and institutional in-
vestors to assess risk also have been hindered by their inability to force cities to disclose
information, see note 39 infra, and the inadequacy of present disclosure by municipali-
ties, see note 25 supra. However, responding to § 13 of the Securities Acts Amendments
of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (Supp. V 1975), and perceptions of increased risk of default
following the New York City crisis, underwriters demanded extensive disclosure and
began to hire more analysts to evaluate the disclosed data. Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1976, at
37, col. 1; id., Jan. 26, 1976, at 14, col. 3.
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alike; there are obvious advantages to manipulating budgets to avoid
both cuts in municipal services and tax increases in an election year.29
Political pressures may also cause excessive use of revenue bonds and
separate fiscal entities, because these financing devices not only cir-
cumvent debt limits and voter referenda requirements but may con-
ceal or obscure governmental actions from investors.30
B. Failure of Existing Regulation to Compel Disclosure
Even as strengthened by the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments, 31
current regulation has failed to ensure adequate disclosure. Municipal
issuers still are subject only to the antifraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts. 32 Since the 1975 Amendments do not clarify the nature
of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) power to enjoin
municipalities,3 regulation of municipal issuers may only be possible
29. See Haider & Elmore, supra note 3, at 5-8. Revenue estimates and allocation of
costs between fiscal years can be used to "hide" funds in order to balance the election
year budget while cutting taxes and increasing services. Id. at 7. If an insufficient
"cushion" has been created for an election year, officials may resort to questionable ac-
counting practices to achieve these results. Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1976, at 24, col. 4.
New York City's ability to conceal a huge budget deficit is the frequently cited,
though perhaps somewhat atypical, example of creative budgeting. The city had "an
antiquated and crazy-quilt accounting system" that was barely comprehensible. Wall St.
J., Mar. 9, 1976, at 17, col. 1; see Municipal Accounting: A Better Blueprint Via IFMS,
J. AccouNrrACY, Dec. 1976, at 42; Official Statement Relating to the Issuance of
$125,000,000 General Obligation Serial Bonds of the City of New York, at 3 (July 1, 1976)
(on file with Yale Law Journal). Accounting gimmicks can only balance the city's books;
they cannot provide the cash to offset current deficits. The city must obtain this cash
through borrowing. New York was no exception. The amount of short-term debt which
New York City had to renew ("roll-over") was far larger than any other city's. JEC, supra
note 1, at 4-5. At the height of the crisis the city was rolling-over $6 billion in short-
term notes annually-30% of all short-term notes issued by all states, counties, and local
authorities in the country. Weisman, supra note 1, at 72.
30. J. MAXWELL & J. ARONSON, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 212 (3d ed.
1977). See generally A. HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONs AGAINST STATE DEBT (1963).
Operating accounts outside of the executive budget (the budget before independent
agencies and funds are accounted for), pushed New York State's spending from $10.8 to
S16.7 billion in fiscal 1977. Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1976, at 24, col. 4. The $16.7 billion
figure still excluded the budgets of 42 independent agencies. Id.
31. The amendments directly applicable to municipal securities have been codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (Supp. V 1975).
32. Securities Act of 1933, § 17, id. § 77q (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10,
id. § 78j.
33. The 1933 and 1934 Acts authorize the SEC to seek injunctions against munic-
ipalities. Section 20(b) of the 1933 Act empowers the Commission to seek an injunction
against any person who is violating (or is about to violate) a provision of the Act. 15
U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970). Section 2(2) of the 1933 Act defines "person" to include "govern-
ment or political subdivision", and the antifraud provision of the Act, § 17, applies to
municipalities. Id. §§ 77b(2), 77q(c). Similarly, § 21(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)
(Supp. V 1975), provides for injunctive relief and is applicable to municipalities ("per-
sons" under § 3(a)(9), id. § 78c(a)(9)) which violate the antifraud provision, § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). But the SEC did not bring a municipal issuer to court until 1976.
See SEC v. Reclamation Dist. No. 2090, Civ. No. C76-1231-SAW (N.D. Cal., filed June 17,
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through damage actions brought under the antifraud provisions. But
the incentive that the threat of damage actions creates to disclose in-
formation is weakened by the failure of the antifraud provisions to
clarify liability standards,34 and to specify who is liable for nondisclo-
sure of information-the city, its officers, the underwriters, or the
brokers. Moreover, there are no clear standards regarding the duty of
underwriters to conduct independent investigations of information
voluntarily provided by municipalities. 33
The confusion in this area is heightened by the uncertainty sur-
rounding constitutional limitations on liability. The Eleventh Amend-
ment, for example, may bar private damage actions against states,30
1976) (first SEC suit against municipal issuer and its officers); Hearings, supra note 1,
at 323 (statement of Robert Doty, Assoc. Prof. of Law, Creighton Univ.). An informal
search of SEC files revealed only 2 other actions brought by the Commission against
issuers of municipal securities. Telephone Interview with Glenn Mays, staff attorney,
office of the General Counsel, SEC (May 4, 1977) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
Moreover, the city of Philadelphia has challenged the constitutionality of the Com-
mission's power to seek injunctive relief against municipalities under the 1933 and 1934
Acts. City of Philadelphia Complaint, City of Philadelphia v. SEC, No. 76-2396 (E.D. Pa.,
filed July 29, 1976).
34. Well-defined liability standards are a means of encouraging certain voluntary
behavior. See generally G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-94 (1970). Individuals
who are risk-neutral will avoid performing acts that lead to liability if the perceived
probability of liability times its cost exceeds the cost of avoidance. See R. POSNER, supra
note 10, at 72. To compel disclosure, liability standards must set out clearly the informa-
tion to be provided, and then must place liability for failure to provide information on
the party who can most cheaply ensure disclosure. See note 87 infra.
In the corporate context, the standards of liability are often ambiguous. Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976) (under § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970),
"scienter" required for damage actions; no decision whether "scienter" required for
injunctive relief); see Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 150.
35. Investigation of disclosed information is necessary to ensure accuracy. Lack of
clear liability standards for failure to investigate has been a major criticism of existing
regulation. See Doty, supra note 2, at 411-17; Hearings, supra note 1, at 124-27 (state-
ment of Richard Kezer, Pres., Dealer Bank Ass'n).
Even in the corporate context, the extent of the underwriter's duty to make in-
dependent investigations is unclear. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(in the absence of allegations of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, private
damage actions do not lie under § 10(b) of 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970)); Sanders
v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), rentanded, 425 U.S. 929 (1976)
(lower court held underwriter liable because it failed to conduct private investigation of
accounting statements certified by accountants involved in fraud); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(D)
(1970) (investigations of official statements not required).
36. Recovery in a damage suit against a state under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 78j(b) (1970), is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Green v. Utah, 539 F.2d 1266
(10th Cir. 1976); Yeomans v. Kentucky, 514 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983
(1975); Brown v. Kentucky, 513 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1975). But see Forman v. Community
Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. United
Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 1288-1310. Local governments, however, are
not covered by the Eleventh Amendment. Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964);
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890).
The court has held that states may waive immunity merely by participating in an
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and even the SEC's authority to investigate possible antifraud viola-
tions has been challenged as an intrusion on state prerogatives.37
Doubts as to which parties are responsible for ensuring full and ac-
curate disclosure may lead to situations in which each party to an
underwriting independently verifies the information or in which no
party does so. 38
Compounding the failure of the statute and case law to specify who
is liable for nondisclosure is the failure to stipulate what information
must be disclosed. Standards of materiality remain ill-defined. In the
absence of such standards, underwriters fearing liability may well be
overzealous in insisting on disclosure by the city or in refusing to
bid on an issue.39 As a result the information they extract may be
activity in an area in which Congress has explicitly created a cause of action. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1974); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186-96 (1964);
see Note, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 331,
343-45 (1966). See generally C. JAcoBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IM-
MUNITY (1972). The right to bring private damage suits is not set out explicitly in § 10(b),
but has been implied by the courts. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971). Questions of liability are further complicated by the prospect that the waiver
rationale may be replaced by a balancing approach recognizing state interests. See Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 688-99 (1976); cf.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (balancing under Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976) (same).
37. Relying primarily on the Supreme Court's recent decision in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), New York City and Philadelphia have questioned the
SEC's power to investigate municipalities for violation of the antifraud provisions. City
of Philadelphia v. SEC, No. 76-2396 (E.D. Pa., filed July 29, 1976); City of New York v.
SEC, No. 76 Civ. 3707, (S.D.N.Y., filed July 27, 1976). New York eventually dropped its
suit against the SEC, but continued to dispute the Commission's power to investigate
the City. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1976, at 46, col. 3.
38. When liability standards are clear, only those parties on whom liability is placed
need balance the risk and potential costs of liability for misinformation against the costs
of verification. As liability standards become less certain, the perceived risk of liability
decreases for those who formerly were certain that they were liable and increases for
parties previously certain that they were not. Thus, depending on the costs of in-
vestigation and the degree of uncertainty surrounding liability standards, many parties
(or no party) may find the costs of verification less expensive than the expected liability
for misinformation.
39. Underwriters or dealers can demand disclosure as a condition of bidding on an
issue of securities, even though they can obtain and subsequently disclose only informa-
tion that the city chooses to provide. Hearings, supra note 1, at 128 (remarks of Richard
Kezer, Pres., Dealer Bank Ass'n). After passage of the 1975 Amendments, some under-
writers refused to bid on issues because of uncertainty as to the type of disclosure
required. Proposals, supra note 2, at 1024-26; Hearings, supra note 1, at 128; Wall St. J.,
Jan. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 6. The yield which a municipality must pay on its debt gen-
erally increases as the number of bids decreases. Kessel, A Study of the Effects of Com-
petition in the Tax-Exempt Bond Market, 79 J. POLITICAL EcoN. 706, 707 (1971); Swensen,
supra note 21, at 132; West, Determinants of Underwriters' Spreads on Tax Exempt Bond
Issues, 2 J. FINANCE & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs 241 (1967). This bid-yield relationship
creates pressure for a municipality to provide information in order to reduce borrowing
costs.
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irrelevant, and the costs they impose substantial. Indeed, underwriters
have forced the state of New York to engage in largely purposeless
disclosure.40
Aside from preserving the minimal antifraud regulation of munic-
ipal issuers, the 1975 Amendments directly regulate municipal brokers
and dealers, requiring these brokers and dealers to register with the
SEC, creating an organization for their self-regulation (the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB)), and prohibiting fraudulent
or manipulative devices as well as any breach of the MSRB's rules.41
The MSRB may provide for periodic examination of brokers and
dealers,42 and the SEC may censure, limit the activities of, or suspend
or revoke the registration of any municipal securities dealer. 43 This
regulatory structure, however, does not resolve the problems of vague-
ness. The statute specifically prohibits the Board from directly or
indirectly prescribing requirements that force disclosure by municipal
issuers.44 Any attempt by the MSRB to specify liability or materiality
standards would seem to contravene that prohibition, because it would
cause-indeed require-brokers and dealers to demand specific informa-
tion. The 1975 Amendments were designed only to cope with abuses
by brokers and dealers in the marketing of securities.45
II. Inadequacies of Proposed Legislation
H.R. 2724, introduced in the current session of Congress and iden-
tical to House and Senate bills considered in the last Congress, is
40. In order to sell $3.66 billion in short-term notes, New York State had to issue a
74-page prospectus, aptly described as fit "for Talmudic scholars." Wall St. J., Mar. 30,
1976, at 24, col. 4; see Casey & Smith, supra note 2, at 645 (N.Y. State, Nassau County,
N.Y., and Baltimore, Md., required to prepare extensive disclosure documents). Con-
troller Levitt of New York State claimed that lawyers for underwriters were over-
emphasizing protection of their clients to the point where information was stated so
conservatively that it became "misinformation." Wall St. J., May 20, 1976, at 27, col. 3.
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board noted in a statement to a congressional
subcommittee that throughout the municipal securities market costly negotiations between
issuers and underwriters had led to disclosure of "possibly non-material items." Hearings,
supra note 1, at 389.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a), (b), (c) (Supp. V 1975). See Proposals, supra note 2, at 1022-
27; Federal Regulation, supra note 2, at 572-79.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(E) (Supp. V 1975).
43. Id. § 78o-4(c)(2).
44. Id. § 78o-4(d)(1), (2). The Board's power is limited to requiring disclosure by
brokers and dealers of information generally available from a source other than the
issuer. Id. § 78o-4(d)(2).
45. See SEN. REP. No. 94-75, 94TH CONG., 1ST Sass. 38-53, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 179, 215-31; Dikeman, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board: A New
Concept of Self-Regulation, 29 VAND. L. Rv. 903, 905-09 (1976).
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the most comprehensive reform yet proposed.40 The proposed legisla-
tion has received careful consideration in hearings before both Houses
of Congress and is likely to provide the basis for future legislative
proposals.47 Municipalities would be required to meet disclosure
guidelines set by the SEC under a broad statutory mandate.48 Unlike
previous proposals,4 9 the bill attempts to accommodate the distinctions
between municipal and corporate securities and to create a separate
regulatory structure for municipal securities. The bill apparently relies
on the 1934 Act's antifraud provisions to enforce its disclosure re-
quirements.50
H.R. 2724 outlines general categories of information to be disclosed,
but delegates considerable power to the SEC to set the specifics and
extent of disclosure. Cities with over $50 million in securities out-
standing are required to file an annual report containing descriptions
of debt, tax and revenue sources, and public service obligations.51 The
annual report must also include audited financial statements as pre-
scribed by the SEC.52 The bill provides further that issues of over $5
million be accompanied by a distribution statement describing the
issue and the intended use of the funds. 53 The SEC is authorized to
46. H.R. 2724, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), re-
printed in Hearings, supra note 1, at 5-13; H.R. 15205, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976),
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 6, at 4-12. This Note will refer only to H.R. 2724.
47. See Hearings, supra note 1; House Hearings, supra note 6.
Both the SEC and the Department of the Treasury supported the general approach
taken by H.R. 2724, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Hearings, supra note 1, at 18-42; House
Hearings, supra note 6, at 19, 29. Aside from full regulation under the 1933 and 1934
Acts, an approach that has received little support, the only significant alternative regula-
tory scheme proposed is that of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, discussed
at not. 88 infra.
48. See Proposals, supra note 2, at 1040-42. H.R. 2724 would add a new § 13A to
the 1934 Act, dealing with municipal securities. H.R. 2724, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Hereinafter citations to H.R. 2724 will be to the subsections of the proposed § 13A,
which are printed in the bill.
49. See note 12 supra.
50. See 122 CoNG. Rac. S1633 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976) (statement of Sen. Williams).
H.R. 2724 does not state whether failure to comply with disclosure standards would be
presumptively (or necessarily) a "manipulative or deceptive device," the liability standard
under the antifraud provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
51. Specifically, the annual report would contain: an identification and description
of the issuer and its securities outstanding; a delineation of legal limits on the issuer's
debt and taxing power; descriptions of the issuer's debt, including short-term notes,
contingent liabilities, and defaults within the last 20 years; a description of the issuer's
major taxpayers and public services; actual tax experience over the last 5 years; and
specification of governmental units with overlapping jurisdictions, and of federal and
other assistance programs available to the issuer. H.R. 2724, § 13A(a)(2)(A)-(I). Some of
these provisions would seem to be applicable only to general obligation bonds, but the
bill does not differentiate among the various types of municipal securities.
52. Id. § 13A(a)(2)().
53. The bill requires the following information: a description of the offering, includ-
ing underwriting arrangements; a detailing of the security and redemption provisions;
for revenue or special assessment bonds, the project or enterprise to be financed; a
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require that the distribution statement include any information set
forth in the annual report.54 The bill also gives the SEC authority to
require that annual reports and distribution statements include
"similar and specific information ... necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 5 Under this statute,
then, the Commission could require municipalities to file distribution
statements as detailed as the prospectuses required by the 1933 Act and
annual reports as exhaustive as those required by the 1934 Act.50 In
contrast to its powers in the corporate field, however, the SEC would
not have power to conduct a pre-offering review of these reports or to
require more frequent disclosure.57
A. Lack of Clear Liability Rules
Although H.R.2724 may ameliorate the materiality problem by
delegating to the SEC the power to set disclosure rules, it fails to
clarify liability standards. It remains unclear who is liable and for
what penalty, who can bring suit, and what defenses are available to
the parties if disclosure of all material information has not been
made.58 Since the bill relies solely on the antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act to enforce disclosure rules,5 9 the failure to clarify liability
description of the intended use of the proceeds of the offering; counsel's opinion as to
the legality of the issuance of the securities; and a statement as to the availability of the
reports required by the bill. Id. § 13A(b)(2)(A)-(F).
54. Id. § 13A(b)(2). When the annual report and distribution statements are combined
they comprise statutory disclosure guidelines similar to the prospectus requirements of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a) (1970).
55. H.R. 2724, § 13A(a)(4), (b)(2)(G).
56. For instance, corporate annual reports must include detailed descriptions of
properties, legal proceedings, corporate officers and directors, and changes in competitive
factors. 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) J1ff 31,101-08 (form 10-K). For a city this could entail,
among other things, elaborate predictions of the future economic health of the region
and detailed descriptions of schools, parks and the like. The SEC could institute such
requirements under its power to set the "form and detail" of financial statements. H.R.
2724, § 13A(a)(2)(J), (b)(2).
57. 122 Cong. Rec. S1634 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976); see H.R. 2724, § 13A(a). For a
general description of SEC review of corporate registration statements, see R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 205-17 (4th ed. 1977). The SEC's power to require
quarterly reports and updates of registration statements is provided by 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)
(1970).
58. The elements in the cause of action, the available defenses, and the damage
formula used after actionable conduct has been proven all enter into the calculation of
a party's expected loss for failure to disclose. H.R. 2724 fails to clarify any of these
standards, except that underwriter liability is limited to the total price at which the
issue was sold to the public. H.R. 2724, § 13A(g); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) (same
provision). The 1933 Act, by comparison, outlines specific liability standards for omis-
sions or misstatements in registration statements. Id. § 77k. This Note proposes codified
liability standards. See pp. 939-46 infra.
59. H.R. 2724 does not give the SEC any enforcement powers beyond those derived
from the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). See 122 CONG.
REc. S1633 (daily ed., Feb. 17, 1976). How these standards apply to municipal issuers and
officers is unclear. See notes 34-37 supra.
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standards discourages voluntary compliance and thus undermines the
effectiveness of the statute.
B. Disclosure and the Problems of Delegation
In setting disclosure standards H.R. 2724 generally does not dis-
tinguish between different types of municipal bonds.6 0 The proper
amount of disclosure, however, depends on the type of municipal
security.61 Under H.R. 2724 the SEC could ensure adequate disclosure
by setting disclosure requirements for each type of bond, tailored to
the special risks of that type. Indeed this delegation of power to the
SEC is essential to the efficacy of regulation under the bill.62 Yet, it
may run afoul of the newly pronounced judicial solicitude for the
prerogatives of local government.
In National League of Cities v. Usery6 3 the Supreme Court limited
Congress's power under the commerce clause to enact legislation af-
fecting state governments. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Rehnquist found, in either the Tenth Amendment or general prin-
ciples of federalism, a constitutional mandate that Congress should
not impair certain attributes of state sovereignty.0 4 The Court then
held that the commerce clause did not give Congress authority to
extend the minimum wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to employees of states and municipalities. 63 Protection
of state " 'functions essential to separate and independent exis-
tence,' "6 the Court held, was a constitutional mandate that could not
60. The only provision applying specifically to "revenue or special assessment" securi-
ties requires that the distribution statement include a description of the project or
enterprise to be financed and any financial or engineering feasibility studies available.
H.R. 2724, § 13A(b)(2)(C).
61. See pp. 923-25 supra.
62. In order to enhance the usefulness of corporate prospectuses, the SEC has created
specialized disclosure forms tailored to the disclosure needs of different categories of
issuers and offerings. WnEAT REPORT, supra note 10, at 68-77. Disclosure requirements for
municipal securities would also have to accommodate diverse issuers and offerings.
63. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
64. The exact constitutional basis for the Court's holding is a matter for speculation.
Justice Rehnquist noted that in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), the Court had
recognized that the Tenth Amendment was an express limitation on federal power over
states. 426 U.S. at 842; see id. at 861-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court also seemed
to rely on the general notion of "the essential role of the States in our federal system of
government." Id. at 844. The Court did not identify a specific constitutional provision
for its limitation of federal power over states, but this Note assumes that the primary
doctrinal foundation was the Tenth Amendment.
65. 426 U.S. at 852 (holding unconstitutional 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5) (Supp. V 1975)
("public agencies" are employers for the purposes of the Act) and id. § 203(x) (state and
local governments are "public agencies")). Usery held that because local governmental
units derive their authority and power from the states, they too are covered by the
Tenth Amendment. 426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
66. 426 U.S. at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
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be abrogated merely by invocation of an "affirmative grant of legisla-
tive authority." 67 Legislation that imposed costs sufficient to displace
state policies68 or that interfered with functions essential to sover-
eignty69 was impermissible, unless, perhaps, it was necessary to achieve
an important congressional goal. 70
Although it is clear that the Court meant to depart from the rather
indifferent view it had taken of the Tenth Amendment over the last 40
years71 the extent of that departure is unclear. Usery provides no
workable guidelines for determination of the limits on commerce
clause legislation. Indeed, the Court sets out eight different constitu-
tional tests without explicating, or perhaps even recognizing, the dis-
tinctions among them.72 Moreover, the Court's failure to articulate its
67. Id. at 845.
68. Justice Rehnquist argued that regulation may displace state policies by raising the
costs of a state activity to a point where the state must fundamentally alter its activities.
See id. at 846-48.
69. Id. at 845.
70. Some indication of a balancing rationale appears in the plurality's treatment of
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). Justice Rehnquist argued that the federal
legislation upheld in Fry was temporary, reasonable in light of the emergency involved,
and carefully drafted to avoid displacing state policy choices. Thus the majority found
Fry consistent with Usery's invalidation of the minimum wage legislation. 426 U.S. at
852-53; see note 79 infra. But see Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment
and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1883-84 (1976) (no indication of balancing
approach in Court's holding).
Justice Blackmun seized on this language to emphasize that the majority was in fact
balancing constitutional provisions. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Since Jus-
tice Blackmun was the swing vote in a 5-4 decision, his opinion is significant, particularly
in light of the position of three dissenters that the Tenth Amendment merely confines
the federal government to its enumerated powers, see id. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
and the contention of Justice Stevens that activities of a "State qua State" can be regu-
lated, id. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun did not attempt to elaborate
on the balancing test he proposed, but he did suggest that the importance of the federal
interest and the necessity of including the state in the regulatory scheme should be
taken into account. Id. at 856.
71. Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities Issuers:
Applying the Test of National League of Cities v. Usery, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 997
(1976); see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled, National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Darby v. United States, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), Justice
Stone noted that "[t]he amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered." In Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975), Justice Marshall
hedged on the Darby statement, observing that Congress may not impair the integrity of
the states or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
However, in Usery Justice Rehnquist found support for the doctrine of intergovern-
mental immunity in cases which noted that considerations of federalism mandated a
limited immunity of the states from the federal income tax. 426 U.S. at 843-44 (citing
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586 (1946) (Stone, C.J.); and Metcalf SL Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926)); see Note, supra at 1000-01.
72. Usery proffers at least eight possible, albeit overlapping, tests of the constitution-
ality of legislation: (I) impairment of attributes of state sovereignty, 426 U.S. at 845; (2)
abrogation of functions essential to separate and independent existence, id. at 845; (3)
forced relinquishment of important governmental activities, id. at 847; (4) displacement
of state policies regarding the manner of delivery of governmental services, id. at 847;
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conception of the federal system deprives notions of "sovereignty" or
"essential state functions" of any analytical content.73 The Court
provides no guidelines to aid in determining whether legislation
represents a "substantial" infringement on the states.74 The holding
is further muddled by the suggestion that the test under the Tenth
Amendment is in f-ct a balancing test sensitive to federal legislative
goals.7 5
It seems clear that the scheme proposed in H.R. 2724 for regulation
of municipal securities is not as burdensome as the provisions in-
validated in Usery. Nonetheless, it is sufficiently analogous to those
provisions to implicate Tenth Amendment limitations.70 The borrow-
ing function, it would appear, is essential to the separate existence of
municipal governments. 77 Municipalities must have access to credit
(5) interference with traditional aspects of state sovereignty, id. at 849; (6) substantial
restructuring of the traditional ways in which local governments have arranged their
affairs, id. at 849; (7) direct displacement of the states' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, id. at 852; and (8) significant
impact on municipalities because of monetary cost, id. at 846. These tests admit of
substantial variations in the activity or right protected and the amount of federal in-
terference allowed. In particular, there are substantial differences between traditional
and essential functions, and between impairment and abrogation. Justice Brennan found
no meaning in any of the standards, id. at 872-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and one
commentator has agreed, Note, supra note 70, at 1881-84. But see Note, supra note 71,
at 1006 (arguing that majority opinion implicitly provides workable test).
73. Justice Brennan derided the "conceptually unworkable essential function test."
426 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Justice Brennan realized, to apply the Usery
tests the Court must develop a conception of the federal system, see id. at 875-76, be-
cause determination of what is "essential" or "sovereign" depends on the duties and
powers of the governmental unit to which a function is allegedly "essential" or "an
attribute of sovereignty." See Note, supra note 70, at 1886-88. The diversity of possible
state functions and the lack of consensus on the role of states in the federal system sug-
gest that the boundary for intergovernmental immunity will be a fragmented and case-
oriented one. But cf. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 n.2 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing "governmental" from "proprietary" activities); Note, supra
note 71, at 1002-03 (stating that Court protected "traditional state services").
74. The method by which the determination of substantiality is to be made is muddled
by the Court's somewhat misleading statement that there was no need to ascertain the
"actual impact" of the wage and hour provision, 426 U.S. at 851, since even according to
the Government's assessments the impact of the provisions was significant. Id.
75. Justice Blackmun's opinion and Justice Rehnquist's treatment of Fry suggest such
an approach. See note 70 supra; Note, supra note 71, at 1004-05.
76. At the House hearings on H.R. 15205, the applicability of Usery was vigorously
debated. Compare House Hearings, supra note 6, at 19, 41, 91-93 with id. at 35-36, 49.
The Treasury Department was particularly concerned about excessive delegation of
rulemaking power to the SEC. Id. at 35-36 (statement of Robert Gerrard, Ass't Sec'y of
Treasury).
77. Any uncertainty over the constitutional status of the borrowing function arises
only because the Usery opinion is unclear as to which state functions are to be accorded
constitutional protection against federal regulation. The power to set wages and hours
was included as a protected function on the bare assertion that it was "[o~ne undoubted
attribute of state sovereignty." 426 U.S. at 845. Just as the power to set wages and hours
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markets to balance the uneven flows of expenses and revenues and to
spread the costs of large capital projects over time.7s
In Usery the Court was particularly concerned with federal regula-
tion that imposed burdensome costs on municipalities.7 9 Since the
collection, compilation, verification, and distribution of information
are expensive, disclosure requirements will increase the distribution
costs involved in issuing municipal securities, thereby reducing the
fraction of borrowed funds that can actually be used to provide ser-
vices.80 Furthermore, by granting the SEC authority to determine the
size of the issue or the amount of outstanding debt that triggers dis-
closure requirements,8' H.R. 2724 delegates power to the SEC ef-
is essential to independent existence, the ability to borrow is also essential both in the
sense that cities must finance their activities, see L. MOAK 9- A. HILLHOUSE, CONCEPTS
AND PRACTICES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 249-61 (1975), and in the sense that sub-
stantial infringement of the borrowing function will necessitate a reordering of policies,
see id. at 291-92. See Note, supra note 71, at 1007-08.
An analogy to the taxing power also suggests the importance of the borrowing power.
Taxation and borrowing are the municipality's two principal sources of revenues for
public services (the third source being intergovernmental transfers). The Supreme Court
has recognized the similarity: "The power to tax is no less essential than the power to
borrow money." WVillcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 225 (1931). The Court has been ex-
tremely chary of interfering with the taxing power of state and local governments. Great
Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1943); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521,
525-26 (1932). The borrowing function deserves similar treatment.
78. See, e.g., R. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 37-39; JEC, supra note 1, at 3-4.
79. Monetary costs alone could have "a significant impact on the functioning of the
governmental bodies involved," even if municipal policies are not reordered. 426 U.S. at
846. The constitutional significance of the costs imposed by regulation is particularly
clear in Justice Rehnquist's discussion of Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 426
U.S. at 852-53. Fry involved a suit by the United States to enjoin Ohio from paying state
employees more than the seven percent wage increase deemed reasonable by the
Emergency Price Control Board under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (expired April 30, 1974). Justice Rehnquist emphasized that not
only was the legislation in Fry temporary, but it also reduced pressure on state budgets
while merely maintaining past state wage policies. 426 U.S. at 853.
Justice Brennan, however, argued that the majority did not rely on the cost argument.
Id. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He described questions of cost as matters of policy
and not as constitutional issues. Id. One commentator has agreed that the cost argu-
ment is "not critical." Note, supra note 71, at 1003, 1006 n.187. But, in fact, the Court
itself did not make clear what factors were critical.
80. The cost of disclosure is part of the expense of floating securities. Corporations
can pass on at least a portion of these costs to their customers by charging a higher price
for their products. And, to minimize disclosure costs, corporations can rely on retained
earnings or private placement of debt. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIREtSTEI, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 423-24, 751-58 (1972). These options generally are not
available to municipalities. See note 12 supra. Further, municipalities would find it
difficult to accumulate cash reserves because of political pressures to reduce taxes and
increase services and because of the substantial burden it would place on current tax-
payers. Municipalities, unlike corporations, do not have customers to whom they can
pass on some of the costs of disclosure.
81. H.R. 2724, § 13A(d).
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fectively to block the entry of small issuers into the bond market.8 2
In addition, the increased costs of raising capital due to disclosure will
displace some policy choices by making projects requiring large capital
outlays more expensive.83 Federal regulation of municipal securities
under the commerce clause is thus likely to receive Tenth Amend-
ment scrutiny.8 4
That scrutiny, or the consequences of it, may well hinder the at-
tempt at regulation. The delegation essential to the efficacy of the
statute will invite frequent Tenth Amendment challenges that could
undermine the regulatory scheme.85 Every extension of disclosure re-
quirements by the SEC will impose costs and will thus become suspect
under at least one of Usery's many standards. If the Court refines
Usery to require a balancing test, constitutionality may be resolved
only on a case-by-case basis.8 6 The elements of the balance-the need
82. Costs of flotation for corporate offerings are significantly higher for smaller
issues. Hearings, supra note 1, at 320; see SEC, CoST OF FLOTATION OF REGISTERED ISSUES
1971-72, at 29 (1974) (approximately $10 per thousand for issues of over $100 million,
compared to S140 for those under S500,000).
83. Costs of projects requiring large cash outlays, such as bridges or mass transit
facilities, would rise significantly if interest rates increased, since such projects are usually
financed with long-term debt. See JEC, supra note 1, at 3.
84. One commentator has argued that S. 2969 (the predecessor of H.R. 2724) is likely
to pass Usery's test of constitutionality because it imposes minimal costs on municipalities
and does not expand SEC enforcement powers. Note, supra note 71, at 1016-20. This
conclusion is overly optimistic. First, the SEC's ability to use its enforcement powers,
even though limited to violations of the antifraud provisions, is significantly expanded
by H.R. 2724's broad delegation of power to the SEC regarding the definition of
fraudulent disclosure. Second, the costs of disclosure will not be known until the SEC sets
specific standards. Most importantly, Usery does not provide guidelines as to which of
its numerous formulations of the constitutional test should be relied on in a given case.
See note 72 supra. Any prediction of Usery's application must be made cautiously.
85. Usery already has prompted litigation concerning the SEC's existing powers under
the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See note 37 supra. Federal courts
have wrestled with the various Usery standards in other contexts. In Christenson v. Iowa,
417 F. Supp. 423, 424-25 (N.D. Iowa 1976), the court upheld the equal work-equal pay
provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975), as applied to states, holding that Usery must be limited to its facts.
Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976), also upheld these equal pay
provisions, but attempted to apply the Usery standard. In doing so the court offered
three alternative rationales. The court first balanced state and federal interests, then held
that the provision did not "directly" displace a state's freedom to structure integral state
functions, and for good measure noted that legislation pursuant to the equal protection
clause is less susceptible to Tenth Amendment challenge than legislation under the
commerce clause. Id. at 720-21; see Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F.
Supp. 637 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (equal pay provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1970), upheld as a minimal intrusion on states, or, alternatively, power to pay
discriminatory wages is not attribute of sovereignty).
86. An administrative agency granted broad powers to regulate municipal securities
may, according to its own balancing of state and federal interests, choose not to
exercise all of these powers. Since a law delegating powers to an administrative agency
is not, on its face, ripe for adjudication unless the specific powers challenged are likely
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for regulation and its intrusiveness on state prerogatives-will probably
vary in relative weight according to the type of security regulated, the
size of the city covered, and the sort of disclosure mandated. Prior cases
would usually be distinguishable and litigation would likely pro-
liferate. As a result the bounds of regulation might be determined
more by the fear of litigation than by the need for disclosure.8 7 Further-
more, fragmentation of the statute by inconsistent judicial decisions
could hamper the SEC's regulatory efforts.88
Even apart from the threat of adverse or inconsistent judicial deci-
sions, Congress should recognize its responsibility in a federal system
to limit direct federal regulation of states.80 When a less intrusive
means of accomplishing federal goals exists, it should be preferred as a
matter of policy. Moreover, congressional action affecting states may
well be accorded a greater presumption of constitutionality than
similar actions by an administrative agency.90 The next section presents
to be exercised by the agency, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-18 (1976), municipalities
must defend their rights on a case-by-case basis. Clear standards would avoid the un-
certainty and litigation costs that accompany delegation.
87. Even if the Supreme Court clarifies the Usery standards, lower courts may be in
conflict over specific actions taken by the SEC under H.R. 2724. Among the SEC's powers,
those particularly likely to provoke litigation include the authority to enlarge the class
of municipalities covered, H.R. 2724, § 13A(d), to prescribe the manner in which the
audit is taken, id. § 13A(a)(2)(J), to specify the forms that the reports and distribution
statements must take, id. § 13A(e), and to require the disclosure of additional informa-
tion, id. § 13A(a)(4), (b)(2)(G).
88. To avoid the problems arising out of delegation of power to the SEC, the MSRB
has proposed that a committee composed of an equal number of representatives of
municipal issuers, underwriters, and the public set disclosure guidelines within a broad
statutory mandate. Hearings, supra note 1, at 395-96. Under the MSRB's proposal com-
pliance with the guidelines would be "voluntary," but only to the extent that compliance
is not essential to the "accuracy and completeness" of information disclosed. See id. at
390-91, 393; Proposals, supra note 2, at 1054-56. Liability would be based on an express
cause of action for damages, similar to § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
Hearings, supra note 1, at 400-02.
The major changes that the Board would make in H.R. 2724 are questionable as a
matter of policy. The Board's proposal gives two-thirds of the voting strength in the
committee to groups with the incentive to impose the strictest possible standards on
municipalities. Materiality standards that are set by a committee dominated by under-
writers and "the public" (predominantly investors and bond counsel) would seem more
intrusive on state interests than delegation of those powers to the SEC. See id. at 326-27
(statement of Robert Doty, Assoc. Prof. of Law, Creighton Univ.) ("inequitable" to sub-
ject issuers to regulation by those private parties with whom they must bargain). Under-
writers and investors could well require cities to provide information even though the
costs to the municipality of providing it far outweigh the value of the information to
underwriters and investors.
89. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489,
539-42 (1954).
90. Congressional action is normally accorded a presumption of constitutionality. P.
BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECIsiONMAKING 1004-10 (1975). Although Justice
Brennan's argument in Usery that the Court should not engage in Tenth Amendment
review because the States are protected by their representation in Congress, 426 U.S. at
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a proposal which, it is argued, accomplishes the same goals as H.R.
2724 with less intrusion on state functions and better-defined liability
standards.
III. A Proposal: Liability and Disclosure Standards
Specific statutory disclosure requirements and liability standards
would avoid the problem of extended constitutional litigation. A
workable statutory framework, however, must set clear disclosure and
liability standards for each type of municipal security. The Note pro-
poses such a statutory framework and argues that it is likely to meet
the tests of Usery.91
A. Liability Standards
If there are well-defined liability standards, direct SEC regulation
of disclosure is unnecessary. 92 An individual faced by possible damage
actions will act to avoid them if avoidance is less costly than the likely
liability.93 Hence, to ensure disclosure at least cost, liability should be
placed on the party who can most cheaply avoid it by disclosing the
relevant information. 94 This principle affords the following guide-
876-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting), was rejected by the majority, id. at 841 n.12, it may still
have enough force to afford congressional regulation of the states a presumption of
constitutionality. See Note, supra note 70, at 1888-90. Certainly "the Court is on weakest
ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the
interest of the states, whose representatives control the legislative process and, by hy-
pothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged Act of Congress."
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Com-
position and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. Rav. 543, 559 (1954).
Administrative determinations enjoy a less weighty presumption. Lower courts, for
example, have rejected the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), largely on the grounds that
severe intrusions on state prerogatives require an "unequivocal" congressional intent.
Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 426 U.S. 904 (1976); see
District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 983-85 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 426
U.S. 904 (1976). A broad delegation of power that may or may not involve intrusion on
state prerogatives would not seem to evince such clear intent. "[C]ourts play a larger
role in reviewing administrative legislation than they customarily assume when the
actions of legislators themselves are challenged." J. MASHAW & R. MERuR.L, INTRODUcTIoN
TO THE AMERIcAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 233 (1975).
91. This Note's approach is similar to that advocated by the Treasury Department,
which called for statutory standards to avoid delegation to the SEC. House Hearings,
supra note 6, at 35-36, 39.
92. For a general discussion of the SEC's administration of the securities laws, see
I L. Loss, supra note 22, at 265-316.
93. See note 38 supra.
94. If the parties agreed on the probability of future liability, and if there were zero
transactions costs, the parties would contract so that the party who could most ef-
ficiently reduce liability costs would do so. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 1-15 (1960). But transactions costs include all costs "which inhibit competitive
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lines: Underwriters should be subject to stringent liability standards
for failure to disclose since they can most cheaply ensure disclosure.
Public officials should be liable only for "willful or reckless disregard"
of the truth. Municipal issuers should be exempt from liability al-
together. Furthermore, these specific standards should appear in the
statute, since reliance on antifraud enforcement creates an unnecessary
degree of uncertainty.95
1. Underwriter Liability
Underwriters are usually the most knowledgeable participants in an
offering. Their business demands familiarity with the securities laws
and the information needs of investors, as well as knowledge of the
municipality whose securities they are selling. 90 Clear underwriter
liability for nondisclosure of material information, in conjunction
with municipal officer liability for fraud, would provide adequate
disclosure at least cost by ensuring that underwriters specifically re-
markets from working," Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product:
A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1655, 1667
(1974). Therefore, the assumption of zero transactions costs requires that the parties
have perfect information and the ability to enter into agreements without cost. Id. That
assumption is untenable where the purpose of negotiations is to determine which party
will verify the adequacy of available information. It has been suggested that when
transactions costs are taken into account liability should be placed on the party who can
avoid liability at the least cost. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1972).
95. A major criticism of H.R. 2724, which relies on enforcement through the anti-
fraud provisions, is that it fails to clarify liability standards. See, e.g., Hearings, supra
note 1, at 124, 228, 243; House Hearings, supra note 6, at 36, 45-46, 49. A similar criticism
can be made of proposals advocating regulation of municipal securities through voluntary
disclosure guidelines enforced by the antifraud provisions. See Borge, Municipal Securi-
ties Offerings and the Need for Voluntary and Responsible Disclosure, 43 CURRENT
MUNICIPAL PROBS. 146 (1976); Doty & Petersen, supra note 2, at 288-90, 377-400; Hearings,
supra note I, at 310-27 (statement of Robert Doty, Assoc. Prof. of Law, Creighton Univ.).
Reliance on the antifraud provisions would require courts to establish special liability
standards for the various participants in municipal offerings. See Doty & Petersen, supra
note 2, at 377-400. Such an approach is inappropriate. The courts may fail to develop a
comprehensive and consistent system of regulation for municipal securities and may not
recognize the important differences between corporate and municipal securities. More-
over, standards set by the courts under the antifraud provisions can evolve only after
considerable litigation. Statutory liability standards, as proposed by this Note, afford
much greater certainty.
96. Since municipal officials have the easiest access to information, presumably they
can most cheaply collect it. But the underwriters can most cheaply determine what
information should be collected. Thus, if underwriters fail to require the municipality to
disclose material information, they are liable. Municipal officials are liable only if they
fraudulently disclose material information. The potential lacuna in this system-negligence
by municipal officials in collecting the information requested by underwriters-is dealt
with by requirements that underwriters perform independent verification of information
they receive. See pp. 941-43 infra. For general obligation bonds the reasonable reliance
defense for underwriters leaves a necessary gap in investor protection that is justified by
the safety of the bonds and the importance of the functions they finance.
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quest and receive material disclosures from municipal officials. More-
over, underwriter liability would spread the risk of misconduct among
many municipal issuers. Underwriters would increase the costs of
floating all municipal securities in order to cover the expected costs
of liability.
The defenses available to underwriters would vary with the type
of security issued.97 This variation in treatment is justified by dif-
ferences in the importance of these types of debt to the municipality,
the possibility of default or significant changes in the likelihood of
repayment, and the amount and type of information needed to assess
the risk of the bond. In all cases, however, underwriters would be
responsible for prescribing the type and form of disclosure to be
prepared by municipal officers.
Since general obligation bonds are the primary source of credit for
municipal governments, 98 the costs of regulating the issuance of these
bonds should be minimized to mitigate the burden that regulation
imposes on the credit market activities of cities and thus to avoid
Tenth Amendment problems. These bonds are also a relatively risk-
free investment,99 and the information needed to make a rough
estimate of their quality-such as debt per capita, general wealth of
the community, and tax rate per $1000 assessed valuation"00-is gen-
erally public. Hence, the benefits of imposing strict liability standards
on underwriters are probably outweighed by the increased under-
writing costs that would result-costs that would be borne at least in
97. Any statutory provision that decreases the likelihood of recovery by potential
plaintiffs will reduce the incentives for underwriters to ensure the truth and complete-
ness of disclosure. Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), provides the best
example of a statutory provision designed to encourage different levels of investigation
by participants in an offering. Separate defenses are provided in § 11(b) for experts,
nonexperts, and persons relying on statements of public officials or documents. Id. § 77k
(b)(3); see Escott v. BarChris, 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); R. JENNINGS 9 H. MARSH,
supra note 57, at 825-35. Arguably these gradations of liability were meant to assure
complete, but not duplicative, investigation of disclosures.
98. General obligation bonds represent almost 60%0 of municipal debt. Hearings,
supra note 1, at 149 (statement of Securities Indus. Ass'n). Revenue bonds are usually a
secondary source of funds for public projects inasmuch as they are often relied on only
when a general obligation debt limit is reached. See L. ECKER-RAcz, THE POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS OF STATE-LOCAL FINANCE 124-25 (1970); A. HEINS, supra note 30, at 83.
99. G. HEMPEL, supra note 12, at 15-32.
100. See id. at 47. Hempel notes that these variables, plus a variable for tax de-
linquency, could explain up to 50% of the variation in observed defaults. Id. at 46.
He notes that the tax delinquency rate reflects a community's willingness to pay, id.,
which an investor could also gauge through newspaper reports. Moreover, extra informa-
tion seemed to add little to the explanatory power of his model. Id. The interest rates
paid by a municipality might decrease if extra information is disclosed. If the munic-
ipality can predict a reduction in interest charges greater than the cost of added dis-
closure, however, it would presumably disclose the information voluntarily. See Bentson,
supra note 10, at 24-25.
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part by municipal issuers.' 0' One means of reducing these costs might
be to allow underwriters a defense such as reasonable reliance on the
statements of municipal officials. 102 Costs may be further reduced by
designating as the statutory standard of materiality information that a
reasonable investor would consider important. 03 Institutional in-
vestors, who demand more detailed information than is required by
this standard, are able to fend for themselves by applying pressure
through the market for the information they need. 04
101. Total costs of flotation of municipal offerings are significantly less than for
corporate offerings. Hearings, supra note 1, at 320 (statement of Robert Doty, Assoc.
Prof. of Law, Creighton Univ.). Presumably at least part of the differential is due to tile
absence of strict liability for municipal security underwriters. If such liability were
imposed, underwriters would demand disclosure as a condition of bidding for a mu-
nicipal issue in order to avoid liability. See Casey & Smith, supra note 2, at 645, 653-54.
They presumably would also demand a premium to build up a fund to protect against
possible future liability. At the hearings on municipal disclosure, underwriters claimed that
underwriter liability would increase costs to municipalities because of increased under-
writing costs and fewer bids. Hearings, supra note 1, at 130 (remarks of Richard Kezer,
Pres., Dealer Bank Ass'n); cf. Kessel, supra note 39, at 707 (issuer costs decrease as
number of bids increases).
102. At present, in order to avoid liability underwriters must satisfy a standard of
due diligence in investigating the veracity of data in corporate registration statements.
The due diligence standard requires reasonable investigation of the issuer as well as
reasonable grounds to believe that statements are true and not misleading. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3)(A), (B) (1970). The due diligence standard necessitates a considerable effort
by underwriters and cooperation from issuers. See Escott v. BarChris, 283 F. Supp. 643,
696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Doty, supra note 2, at 417-22; Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence
Refined, 68 COLust. L. REV. 1411, 1415-22 (1968).
The reasonable reliance standard only requires reasonable grounds to believe that the
information provided is accurate and complete. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C), (D) (1970).
Although the "reasonable reliance" standard dictates less investigation than the due
diligence standard, there is no reason that it should become, as Senator Williams in-
timated, "an invitation [to an underwriter] to protect himself by putting blinders on
and earmuffs, too." Hearings, supra note 1, at 133. Under any standard the courts must
determine whether, in a particular situation, the underwriter's actions were reasonable.
The reasonable reliance standard does not permit the underwriter to request less in-
formation; it merely reduces the need for independent verification of data.
103. The materiality standard proposed is the Supreme Court's most recent formula-
tion under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). TSC Indus., Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). A broader standard of materiality would include
information that might be of use to investors, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972), or that would be of use to "speculators and chartists," SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1969).
104. See R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 198-99. Individual investors spend little time
evaluating investment information, see Lease, Lewellen & Schlarbaum, The Individual
Investor: Attributes and Attitudes, 29 J. FINANCE 413, 427 (1974), and hence detailed
(i.e., expensive) information is unlikely to be material to them.
Legislation must also provide criteria for standing, causation, and computation of
losses. For general obligation bonds, where it is desirable to reduce costs of issuance as
much as possible and where the likelihood of default is small, the statute might in-
corporate restrictions on recovery similar to the provisions of § 11 of the 1933 Act. 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1970). Section 11 computes damages by taking the difference between the
amount paid for the'security (not exceeding the price at which it was offered to the
public) and the value at the time of suit, at the time of disposal before suit, or at the
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The underwriter would face more stringent liability standards for
revenue and industrial development bonds. These forms of debt play
a subsidiary role to general obligation bonds in municipal financingaoa
Since these bonds present risks similar to those of corporate bonds,100
underwriters should be held to the standards of liability applicable to
underwriters of cotporate securities'07 and thus would be accorded
only a due diligence defense against challenges to their procedures for
verification of information supplied by the municipality. Regulation
would provide underwriters with stronger incentives to force disclosure
and to investigate the veracity of the information disclosed for revenue
and industrial development bonds than for general obligation bonds.
2. Liability of Municipal Officials
The civil liability of municipal officials should be limited to
liability for fraud. Although municipal officers will generally know
if their statements are plainly false, they usually do not have the
necessary knowledge either of the securities laws or of accounting to
determine when statements may be inadequate or misleading to in-
vestors. Underwriters can make these determinations at a lower cost.' 08
Moreover, the threat of personal loss posed by failure to disclose would
deter some prospective officeholders from serving, a primary con-
time of disposal before judgment (if damages are thereby reduced). Id. § 77k(e). Under-
writer liability is limited to the total price of the securities underwritten. Id., accord
H.R. 2724, § 13A(g).
The standing requirement under § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), which limits stand-
ing to plaintiffs claiming losses arising out of a purchase or sale of securities, might be
retained. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
Similarly, recoveries could be restricted by requiring the plaintiff to show reliance on
material information. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970) (plaintiff must show reliance on
inaccurate registration statement if accurate earnings statement is subsequently issued).
These or similar provisions would limit possible recoveries and hence underwriter costs.
105. Since revenue bonds sell at higher interest rates than general obligation bonds,
A. HEINs, supra note 30, at 36; Swensen, supra note 21, at 123, revenue bonds would not
be an economical alternative to general obligation bonds for most projects. Revenue
bonds are economical only when the extra costs of borrowing are outweighed by the
advantages of not pledging the city's credit. A. HEINs, supra note 30, at 85.
106. See notes 21 9- 22 supra.
107. Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), sets up strict civil liability for
false registration statements. Since underwriters are covered by § 11, id. § 77k(a), they
are strictly liable for misstatements unless they sustain the burden of proving an affirma-
tive defense, such as a due diligence investigation. Id. § 77k(b). See generally 3 L. Loss,
supra note 22, at 1683-1746 (1961).
108. L. EcKER-R.cz, supra note 98, at 123-24; see Federal Regulation, supra note 2, at
594 n.167. Only the largest cities are likely to have house counsel or financial advisors
who can provide the needed expertise. L. ECKER-RAcZ, supra note 98, at 123. Moreover,
underwriters have constant contact with the market and are able to determine the needs
of investors at little cost.
943
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 919, 1977
sideration weighed by the Supreme Court in strengthening the "good
faith" defense for public officials charged with violating an individ-
ual's civil rights.109 Finally, fear of personal liability for official acts
may cause decisionmakers to use the municipality's resources to protect
themselves rather than to further the interests of the city." 0 Hence,
fraud in this context may best be narrowly defined, requiring, for
example, "willful or reckless disregard" of the truth."'
3. Issuer Liability
a. General Obligation Bonds
Despite almost universal support for some sort of municipal issuer
liability, there has been little public discussion of the purposes or
consequences of such liability.112 Placing liability on municipal issuers
will produce useful disclosure only if the possibility of future claims
against the municipality provides an incentive for public officials or
voters to ensure that disclosure. However, an official's desire for re-
election will often prevail over any sensitivity to the possibility of
municipal liability." 3 Nor is issuer liability likely to induce voters to
109. "The most capable candidates for school board positions might be deterred from
seeking office if heavy burdens upon their private resources from monetary liability were
a likely prospect during their tenure." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975)
(liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)) (footnote omitted).
110. When the public and private incentives of decisionmakers diverge, there is a
danger that decisions optimal from the social perspective will not be made. See Tullock,
Public Decisions as Public Goods, 79 J. POLITICAL ECON. 913 (1971). Liability for reason-
able mistakes "would undoubtedly deter even the most conscientious school decision-
maker from exercising his judgment independently, forcefully, and in a manner best
serving the long-term interest of the school and the students." Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. at 319-20. Municipal officer liability stricter than that imposed by the antifraud
sections would create a heavy personal responsibility to investors. Federal Regulation,
supra note 2, at 592. Such liability would significantly reduce the responsiveness of
elected officials to the electorate. Underwriter liability avoids these problems while still
protecting investors.
111. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (standard for fraud
under 1934 Act, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970)).
112. See, e.g., Proposals, supra note 2, at 1054-55; Hearings, supra note 1, at 393
(statement of MSRB).
113. A. DowNs, AN ECONOMC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 174-75 (1957). The danger of
politically expedient nondisclosure is greatest when the city's economic condition and
citizens' expectations make it difficult to balance the budget while satisfying the
electorate's desires for increased services and lower taxes. Unfortunately, these are
exactly the situations in which default is possible and therefore disclosure is most
needed. Budgets are inevitably a product of political processes, and even in noncrisis
situations, administrators of government agencies attempt to conceal their true perfor-
mance from the public. S. HowARD, CHANGING STATE BUDGETING 11-14, 49-51, 102-07 (1973).
Labor negotiations offer many examples of municipal officials sacrificing the best in-
terests of the city to political expedience-here, to satisfy politically powerful unions.
See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 121-28 (1971).
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exert pressure on public officials for disclosure. The liability is far too
contingent and the problem far too complex to incite a reaction at the
polls. 4 Municipal issuer liability would provide few effective in-
centives for more complete and accurate disclosure. Hence, municipali-
ties should not be liable for violations of disclosure requirements in
connection with issuance of general obligation bonds.
Placing liability primarily on underwriters and exempting munic-
ipal issuers from liability could, however, have a negative impact on
investor confidence in general obligation bonds. Investors might fear
that underwriters alone would be unable to compensate them for
losses caused by nondisclosure. Although investor reactions are often
unpredictable and irrational, the infrequency of defaults on municipal
bonds and the secure financial position of underwriters should dampen
any adverse reaction. A greater danger is that underwriters will refuse
to bid or will demand exorbitant compensation. Given the defenses
provided underwriters of general obligation bonds an underwriter
should have no difficulty meeting its statutory responsibilities.
b. Revenue Bonds
Revenue bonds are issued by an entity created to manage a revenue-
producing project. Because they do not have to seek reelection, project
officials have much less incentive than municipal officials to sacrifice
the long-run health of the project to win votes. Furthermore, although
revenue project officials are not required to maximize the profit-
ability of the project, it is likely that they will attempt to minimize
conflicts with and criticisms from the public and bondholders.-1 5 Of-
ficials can be expected to provide adequate disclosure to avoid disrup-
tive civil damage actions. Hence, an express civil damage action
against revenue projects should be created. The standards applicable
to corporations under the 1933 Act, including strict liability of the
114. Furthermore, since voters are unlikely to have access to more information than
investors, they would not be able to make informed judgments as to whether the costs of
further borrowing outweigh the benefits of the programs to be financed, or whether the
costs of further disclosure outweigh the reduction in potential liability.
115. Like members of public utility commissions, revenue project officials are under
no obligation to maximize profit, but are subject to pressures from consumers of the
public service, bondholders, and other special interest groups. Since officials can be
expected to maximize their own job satisfaction and security, it would appear to be in
their interest to ensure the continued operation of the project and to placate the
demands of all interest groups. See Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Struc-
tural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & EcON. 291,
297-98 (1974).
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issuer, should apply.116 If the municipality considers the services
provided by the project to be so vital that the project should not be
liable in the same manner as a corporation, it can finance the services
with general obligation debt.
c. Industrial Development Bonds
The issuer of an industrial development bond is, in substance, the
industrial firm that rents the plant.117 Other than the terms of the
lease, all information material to investors in industrial development
bonds relates to this firm."18 These bonds should therefore be con-
sidered obligations of the industrial firm, as they would if the firm had
issued its own securities to finance the industrial plant. The firm
should be liable as if the securities were its own.
B. Disclosure Standards
A disclosure policy should ensure that underwriters, rating agencies,
and professional investors have enough information to evaluate a
security, and that their evaluations reach individual investors.'" More-
over, the requirements should be the minimum necessary to ensure
investor protection. 2 0 That minimum varies for each type of security,
and therefore sepaiate disclosure requirements are needed for general
obligation, revenue, and industrial development bonds. It is necessary
to consider the need for distribution statements and annual reports for
each type of bond.
Distribution statements should be required for all new issues of
municipal securities that exceed a statutorily-specified amount.' 2' For
116. Strict liability for misrepresentations in registration statements is provided for
in § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). The Act also gives the SEC power to
investigate or seek an injunction against any issuer suspected of violating any provision
of the Act. Id. §§ 77s(b), 77t. See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 22, at 1683-1746.
117. See Spiegel, supra note 22, at 232.
118. The terms of the lease are vitally significant and should be disclosed in addition
to the corporate data.
119. Regulation of brokers and dealers by the MSRB ensures that their evaluations
reach individual investors. See p. 930 supra. The goal of regulation should not be
to ensure that issuers directly inform all holders of municipal securities, since investors
receive disclosed information through secondary sources. See Knauss, supra note 11, at
618-19; Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 1151, 1164-70 (1970).
120. See note 11 supra.
121. Statutory standards avoid delegation to the SEC of power to change the scope
of legislation. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 34 (Edwin Yeo, Under Sec'y of Treasury)
(suggesting that to avoid Tenth Amendment problems, SEC only be allowed to raise
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general obligation bonds, H.R. 2724's provisions are of adequate
specificity, except that the contents of financial statements must be
outlined in the statute.1-2 Distribution statements for revenue bonds
should provide the same type of information disclosed for general
obligation bonds as well as descriptions of the project to be funded,
including revenue estimates and descriptions of the legal powers and
obligations of the officials who manage the project.123 Industrial
development bond distribution statements should include descriptions
of the plant and the uses for which it is designed, plus the information
about the firm renting the plant that would be included in a 1933 Act
registration statement.1 24 The proposed distribution requirements
should provide information adequate to assess the risk of each type of
security. 21 In recognition of the costs of disclosure, the proposal at-
tempts to do no more.
The need for annual reports depends on the amount of trading in
the bond and the degree to which current data have an effect on market
price. 26 If there is minimal trading in a security, the costs of disclosure
"issue size" and "debt level" thresholds which determine whether a municipality is
subject to disclosure requirements); House Hearings, supra note 6, at 35-39 (Robert
Gerard, Ass't Sec'y of Treasury) (urging statutory standards rather than delegation to
the SEC).
122. See notes 51 & 52 supra. The financial statements should contain consolidated
balance sheets and income statements, and estimates of unfunded pension liabilities. See
Cooruas & LYBRAND, supra note 25, at 13-14. The most important disclosure may well be
that of short-term debt. While accounting gimmicks may balance books, a city generally
can obtain cash only through taxes, transfers from other governmental units, and bor-
rowing. New York City could not have accumulated such a large deficit if it had not
obtained short-term credit in such enormous amounts. JEC, supra note 1, at 24-25; see
note 29 supra.
123. See p. 924 .& note 21 supra. Although some revenue projects are entirely in-
dependent of municipal government, many are not. The difficulty of drawing a line
separating projects that are affected by the city's financial health from those that are
not dictates a blanket rule that information about a city be disclosed.
124. See note 22 supra; 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970). Information about the municipality
would not be required, since typically the municipality does not back the bonds with its
taxing power. See 4 L. Loss, supra note 22, at 2588.
125. All of the above statements would be filed at a central repository and at the
issuer's main office. See H.R. 2724, § 13A(f)(3). Copies would be made available by the
issuer at a price reflecting the costs of copying, mailing, and handling. There would be
no prospectus requirement, because prospectuses do not provide much information that
is useful to either the individual investor or specialist. See Kripke, The Myth of the
Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAw. 631, 632-36 (1973). Underwriters could choose to issue
prospectuses in order to increase investor confidence, and, concomitantly, bond prices.
126. In general there is little need for annual reports. The large dollar size (usually
5,000 face value) and lack of fungibility of municipal securities restrict the market to
investors with large resources and segment the market among different maturitv dates
and interest rates, raising significantly the costs of trading. See Doty & Petersen, supra
note 2, at 317-19. Furthermore, most individual investors buy municipal securities to
hold until maturity. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 48, col. 2. As a result, the
secondary market for municipal securities is small. Indirect Regulation, supra note 2, at
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would probably outweigh its benefits because economic efficiency
would not be seriously affected if the market value deviates from the
underlying economic value. 27 Similarly, if those characteristics of the
issuer that affect the bond's market price are stable, current data are
not necessary even though the market price of the bond may fluctuate
due to other factors.12 8 For general obligation bonds, the market price
should depend on the market rate of interest, the coupon rate of the
bond (which is constant), and the ability of the city to collect revenues
sufficient to pay its debt service. The latter factor changes so slowly 2
that for a city with enough bonds outstanding to generate substantial
trading, the distribution statements required when it reenters the
market should provide adequate current disclosure. 30 Thus, annual
reports are unnecessary for general obligation bonds.
Revenue bonds usually provide the initial capital needed to finance
a public project and are repaid over long periods of time. 1' Revenue
bond issues tend to be much larger than general obligation issues,"32
574; S. REP. No. 93-1145, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974). But cf. R. ROBINSON & D. WVRIGHTS-
MAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE AcCUMULATION AND ALLOCATION OF WEALTH 73-75 (1974)
(market moderately active, particularly in times of credit stress).
127. To satisfy economic efficiency criteria the price an investor pays for a bond
should correspond to the probable returns from the bond-namely the interest and
principal weighted by the possibility of default. This requirement is applicable to
purchases in the secondary market as well as initial offerings. See V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 80, at 980-83. Adequate information allows investors to choose
the portfolio they prefer on the basis of their risk-return preferences. Lintner, A Model
of a Perfectly Functioning Securities Market, in EcoxoMIc POLICY AND THE REGULATION
OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 143, 160-63 (H. Manne ed. 1969). When the information needed
to assess probabilities is unavailable, rational decisionmaking, and hence efficient eco-
nomic choice, becomes very difficult. See Dorfman, Decision Rules under Uncertainty, in
Cosr-BENEFrr ANALYSIS 360, 391-92 (R. Layard ed. 1972). But where trading is minimal
the costs of disclosure can not be justified by the gains resulting from more informed
portfolio selection.
128. The primary determinant of the price of fixed income securities is the market
rate of interest, since that interest rate determines the return that an investor can
obtain on alternative investments. The municipal bond market also experiences highly
volatile prices caused by the instability of large investors' demand for tax-free income.
See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 12, at 103. None of the information the
municipality could disclose would help predict the trends of these exogenous factors.
129. For large cities, significant changes in the tax base, the ultimate source of
security for general obligation bondholders, are unlikely to occur over a period shorter
than several years.
130. Usually only the obligations of large and well-known governmental units are
traded on national markets. R. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 149. Larger governmental
units are likely to enter the new issue market frequently, and information obtained from
this process can be supplemented by the national and financial media.
131. J. MAXWELL & J. ARONSON, supra note 30, at 209-11.
132. TWENTIErH CENTURY FUND, supra note 12, at 92 (72.6% of general obligation
issues were less than $2.5 million par value, compared with 49.9% for revenue bond
issues).
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and there are often restrictions on refundings.13 3 Since issues are large
and infrequent, and since there can be substantial trading in the larger
issues,134 there is a need for current disclosure when a project's out-
standing debt surpasses a statutory minimum, perhaps H.R. 2724's
$50-million level.135 The need for current disclosure is reinforced by
the likelihood of fluctuations in project revenues, 136 the detailed
analysis needed to assess credit risk, 3 7 and the incentives for project
officials to color disclosures to avoid bondholder unrest. 38
The market price of industrial development bonds is sensitive to
the same factors that affect the market price of securities of the firm
renting the industrial plant being financed. Annual reports similar to
those issued by corporations should be issued for those bonds. 39
Because the default risk of revenue and industrial development
133. SIA, supra note 16, at 55-56. Some revenue bond indentures restrict the issuance
of additional bonds to those needed to complete the facility. Id. at 56. Of course a large
and diversified public authority, such as the Port Authority of New York, is likely to
issue bonds more frequently, and is usually subject to an "open end" indenture that
restricts additional debt by placing conditions on the required ratio of revenues to debt
service. See id.; note 21 supra. Issues are still likely to be infrequent because of their
large dollar size.
134. See R. ROBINSON 9- D. ,VRIGHTSMAN, supra note 126, at 272.
135. H.R. 2724, § 13A(a)(1).
136. The likelihood of fluctuations in revenues is usually greater for revenue than
for general obligation bonds, although certain types of revenue bonds (such as those
financing sewer districts) have extremely stable revenues. R. RoBINSON & D. VRIGHTS,AN,
supra note 126, at 271-72. Fluctuations in revenues assume major importance for in-
vestors in revenue bonds because the public projects are often financed totally by debt.
See A. HEINS, supra note 30, at 26; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 12, at 52-53.
Fluctuations in revenues combined with a large fixed debt obligation increase the likeli-
hood of a default on interest payments.
137. Credit analysis is far more complex for revenue than for general obligation debt.
A. RABNOWITZ, supra note 18, at 42. Revenue bonds can assume a bewildering number
of legal forms, each of which necessitates its own peculiar types of credit analysis and
investment information. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 12, at 44-53.
138. If bondholders do not press revenue project officials for information, the of-
ficials may not disclose unfavorable information in order to avoid bondholder criticism.
See Joskow, supra note 115, at 297-99.
139. For instance, the Commission may require that annual reports disclose material
contracts as well as remuneration of directors, officers and underwriters. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781
(b)(1)(D), (1)(I), (3) (1970). To avoid claims of interference with local policy decisions, the
SEC should not have the power to require a pre-offering review of these reports. In the
corporate field, the Commission has acquired considerable power by conditioning
acceleration of its pre-offering review on the issuer's compliance with substantive re-
quirements. 1 L. Loss, supra note 22, at 277-83 (1961); Schneider, Reform of the Federal
Securities Laws, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1023, 1027, 1030 nAl (1967).
The need for annual reports should not be determined simply by the amount of
trading in the industrial development bonds. Since under the proposed regulatory scheme
these bonds are to be regarded as liabilities of the corporation, annual reports should
be required if any of the corporation's securities are traded on a national exchange, 15
U.S.C. § 78a (1970), or if the corporation has assets of over $I million and more than
500 holders of a class of equity securities, id. § 78g(I). The proposal thus defers to the
congressional scheme for corporate securities regulation.
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bonds is sensitive to such market forces as costs and sales, which are
reflected in financial statements, the statute would require an in-
dependent audit for these types of bonds. Audits would not be re-
quired for general obligation bonds. 140 In some cases, however, an
underwriter might require an audit to satisfy its duty of investigation.
Although uniform accounting standards and mandatory independent
audits would simplify financial analysis141 and possibly bolster in-
vestor confidence in municipal securities, the costs of such require-
ments, coupled with the necessity of delegating power to set standards
in order to accommodate the diverse nature of municipal entities, 142
far outweigh the benefits. These benefits might well be obtained
through voluntary compliance with industry-wide standards, rein-
forced by underwriter pressure. 143
Municipal securities should not be exempt from disclosure require-
ments if they are subject to state disclosure regulation. 44 While states
could regulate municipal securities more extensively than could
federal authorities confined by the Tenth Amendment,"45 the stan-
dards proposed ensure that certain minimum requirements are im-
posed.
Exemption of insured municipal issues would be appropriate if
Congress authorized the SEC to certify insurers of municipal secu-
rities.' 46 Insurance would provide additional security for investors and
140. H.R. 2724 requires independent audits of financial statements contained in annual
reports and distribution statements. H.R. 2724, § 13A(a)(2)(J), (b)(2).
141. H.R. 2724 delegates power to set accounting standards to the SEC. Id. § 13A(e).
142. Although creation of uniform disclosure and accounting standards at the state
level has been proposed, BUs. WEEK, Oct. 11, 1976, at 36, the North Carolina Local
Government Commission, which attempted to set uniform standards as a part of its
role as the marketing agency for local debt, found that it had to permit variations for
individual communities. Hearings, supra note 1, at 117. For instance, the methods by
which inventories or capital assets are valued differ as a product of local laws and
diverse governmental structures and functions. See L. MOAK & A. HILLHOUSE, supra note
77, at 332-37.
143. See Petersen, Doty, Forbes & Borque, Searching for Standards: Disclosure in the
Municipal Securities Market, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1196 (level of voluntary disclosure
increased dramatically in year ending in Spring 1976). Accounting guidelines have been
developed by the Municipal Finance Officers Association (MFOA). MFOA, DIsCLOsURE
GUIDELINES FOR OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1976). Under-
writer pressure for compliance with these guidelines can accommodate the diverse legal
requirements and functions of municipal units.
144. H.R. 2724 provides for a state regulation exemption from the annual report, but
not the distribution statement requirements. H.R. 2724, § 13A(c)(1).
145. Constitutional restrictions on federal regulation are discussed at pp. 933-39 supra.
States already have mechanisms for regulating local finance. Proposals, supra note 2, at
1055-57.
146. Insured issuers need not publicly disclose any information because, barring
failure of the insurance company, investors are assured interest and return of principal.
Insurance companies would presumably only insure municipal issues that they deem to
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would ensure a thorough examination of a city's creditworthiness.
Through certification the SEC could guarantee that insurers of mu-
nicipal securities have sufficient financial resources and adequate
procedures for evaluating investment quality.1 47
Conclusion
The federal government has a substantial interest in stabilizing the
municipal bond market because of its importance in national capital
markets and because of the number of investors involved.' 4s The
Usery decision seems to require that federal regulation impinging on
essential state functions manifest a congressional recognition and ac-
commodation of state interests.' 49 Specifically, Usery appears to re-
quire that in regulating states Congress use the most limited approach
available.1 5O This Note's proposal is a limited and carefully drafted
reaction to the unstable conditions existing in the municipal bond
market. The specific provisions evince a solicitude for state interests;
they carefully limit the liability of issuers and their officers, set dis-
closure for each type of bond at minimum levels consistent with in-
vestor protection, and exempt small issues and bonds covered by in-
surance. In fact, municipalities may well be a major beneficiary of
regulation because a properly functioning municipal securities market
should reduce their cost of borrowing.
have a low default risk. To assure the financial health of approved insurance com-
panies, the SEC should be given power to supervise their operating methods and
financial status. Insurers of municipal securities would also be subject to state regulation
of insurance companies. Hearings, supra note 1, at 381 (statement of Municipal Issuers
Service Corp., managers of Municipal Bond Insurance Ass'n). Senator William Proxmire,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, has ex-
pressed interest in a federal insurance scheme for municipal securities, coupled with
budget and reporting requirements. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1976, at 7, col. 1.
Even without an exemption from disclosure regulation, many municipalities would
find insurance an economical choice. The tightening market for municipal securities
following New York City's financial crisis prompted insurers to sell policies that
guaranteed the interest and principal on municipal securities. Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1976,
at 16, col. 3. Issuers hoped to recoup the insurance costs through lower interest rates. Id.
From May 1974 through July 1976 the Municipal Bond Insurance Association insured
$1 billion in principal amount of tax-exempt bonds. Id., July 21, 1976, at 23, col. 4.
147. In approving an insurer the Commission would consider the quality of the in-
surer's evaluation-for instance, the number of analysts, the extent of independent in-
vestigation, and the process by which evaluations of individual analysts are reviewed.
148. See note 4 supra.
149. See Note, supra note 70, at 1888-91. The attempt to accommodate state interests
should be apparent from the statutory language, since legislative history is a less reliable
indicator that serious consideration was given to these interests. Id. at 1888 n.125.
150. See id. at 1889 (suggesting that Usery requires Congress to choose the least in-
trusive alternative).
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Under a reasonable construction of the rather murky Usery deci-
sion, the Note's proposal appears to meet the constitutional tests and
certainly seems more likely to pass muster than current legislative
alternatives. By combining clear statutory disclosure standards and
enforcement through specific liability provisions, this Note's proposal
avoids the dual dangers of uncertainty and excessive delegation, albeit
at the expense of flexibility. The municipal securities market can
function much more smoothly if participants are aware of their
responsibilities in the disclosure process. Statutory standards, if they
achieve the same congressional goals as delegation of power to set
standards, are a less intrusive means of regulation because the extent
of the intrusion on state prerogatives is clear and subject to expansion
only by further legislation. 151
151. See pp. 937-38 supra.
